Insurrection Page 18

  Rutland continued as a Justice of the Peace for Lincoln during this period and received considerable grants of lands in March 1541 – seven lordships and manors, six rectories, the hospital of St Giles in Beverley and a priory in York. In addition, he was granted a long list of lands throughout the Midlands, including the monastery of Garadon in Leicestershire. This was followed a couple of months later by the grant of a manor and lands in Grantham and Barrowby, in Lincolnshire, and further lordships and manors in Leicestershire, Northamptonshire and Yorkshire. Grants of priories in Lincolnshire and Yorkshire were again made in July 1541.135 It should be acknowledged, however, that Rutland’s main sphere of influence was the Midlands – much closer to the core of power, the Court. He thus did not fit the profile of an ‘over-mighty’ peripheral magnate of the far north.

  When the king made his long overdue visit to the North in the summer of 1541, Rutland was in attendance when Henry entered Lincoln on 9 August.136 The following summer saw Rutland sent north to the Scottish border, together with Sir Robert Bowes. In August 1542, he was appointed warden of all three marches. The following month, Rutland was the beneficiary of yet further grants, including one of £183 12s 6d.137 In April 1543, the earl received another grant of lands, chapels and a pension.138 This was the last recorded grant before his death in September 1543. Indeed, Rutland’s ‘intrusion’ into the power structures of the far north, especially the marches, reveals that the king must have trusted him more than the traditional regional magnates and thus sought to sideline them.

  George Hastings, the Earl of Huntingdon was the grandson of William, Lord Hastings, trusted companion and councillor to Edward IV, who had been executed by Richard III in 1483. The Pilgrimage of Grace afforded Hastings the opportunity of demonstrating his loyalty to the Crown. In early October, at Ashby-de-la-Zouch, when news came of the risings in the North, he was swift to indicate that he was ready to raise troops against the king’s rebellious subjects. Alongside the earls of Shrewsbury and Rutland, he joined the forces headed by the Duke of Norfolk, remaining in Yorkshire until the dissemination of the royal pardon in December. In May 1539, his son was rewarded: Sir Francis, Lord Hastings was granted an annuity of £20 from the manors of Goodeby and Overtonquartermarshe, Leicestershire.139 Hastings continued in favour and in royal service until he died on 24 March 1544.

  Although George Talbot, 4th Earl of Shrewsbury was a conservative and unimpressed by Anne Boleyn, he remained steadfastly loyal to Henry during the Lincolnshire Rising and the Pilgrimage of Grace. Once informed of the disturbances in Lincolnshire, on 4 October, he mobilised his servants, tenants and friends, raising men on horseback. Shrewsbury stated that the king’s subjects had risen in great numbers, ‘contrary to their duties and allegiance’.140 A week later, the earl wrote to Lord Darcy stating that he heard that Darcy’s neighbours had begun to rise, as they had in Lincolnshire. He advised Darcy to remain in his country.141 He was to write to Darcy again on 1 November, praising him for having stayed the commons: in his opinion, a good and honourable deed.142

  Shrewsbury followed this up in the New Year with a letter to the king, advising the sovereign that he should write a letter of thanks to Lord Darcy.143 Henry responded three days later and confirmed that he had indeed written a ‘gentle’ letter to Darcy, in accordance with Shrewsbury’s recommendation. The king stated that he trusted that Darcy would now do his duty and he, the king, would regard this favourably, as if nothing had happened to the contrary.144 This exchange of correspondence is somewhat surprising given Darcy’s subsequent execution for treason. This appears, once again, to be evidence of Henry’s duplicitous nature. Talbot was obviously attempting to steer Darcy clear of suspicion and trouble and had demonstrated his own loyalty to the king. He was, it seems, of the opinion that Darcy was inherently honourable and wanted to make Henry aware of this. As Talbot had proven his loyalty to the Crown and was an important noble and commander north of the Trent, it would appear that Henry sought to appease him by acquiescing at this point. The evidence suggests, however, that Darcy was a marked man in the king’s eyes from early in the Pilgrimage (see the king’s letters of admonition) and was biding his time in order for the opportunity to punish him to arise.145

  After the rebels captured York and Pontefract Castle and began to threaten the town of Doncaster in October 1536, Shrewsbury marched north to prevent its capture. Shrewsbury and Norfolk were outnumbered and forced to negotiate with the Pilgrims. Shrewsbury’s actions halted the momentum of the rising. The rebels did not march on London and their way was blocked by the area of influence of the Earl of Shrewsbury, centred on Sheffield and extending southwards through Derbyshire to Nottinghamshire. The earl’s loyalty to Henry VIII was therefore crucial to the failure of the Pilgrimage.

  In the aftermath of the Pilgrimage, Shrewsbury both added to and developed his estates. He acquired the lands of the former monasteries of Rufford in October 1537, which included the manor of Worksop and the lordship of Rotherham. The annual value was £246 15s 5d with rent of £46 15s 5d.146 Following his death on 26 July 1538, his income was assessed at £1,735147 and he was succeeded by his son, Francis, as the 5th Earl. Shrewsbury’s role in the crisis was pivotal – if the rebels had managed to secure his support, they might have achieved their goals.

  Thomas Cromwell assured Shrewsbury that he was the ‘most woorthye erll that ever servyd a prince and suche a chefftayn as ys worthye eternall glorye’.148 Henry and Cromwell, it appears, were well aware of the strategic importance of keeping Talbot onside. Shrewsbury had the potential to raise his retinue and clientage. Given his geographical landed base, Talbot had the means to have tipped the balance of power during the Pilgrimage from stalemate to a decisive outcome in favour of the Pilgrims. Had he taken this stance, other nobles may well have followed suit.

  Henry Clifford, Earl of Cumberland’s loyalty to the king is seen clearly during the Pilgrimage of Grace. He was initially instructed to lead a force to Hexham, Northumberland, where the monks had barricaded themselves in the monastery in defiance of the commissioners sent to suppress it. He attempted to fulfil this command but must have been forced to retreat to his castle at Skipton. Cumberland was trapped there by an insurrection of his own tenants, who attacked his houses and killed his deer. At the Pilgrims’ Council at York on 21 November 1536, a letter was sent to the earl, requesting that he surrender Skipton Castle149 – a request he obviously ignored.

  Cumberland’s son, Henry, Lord Clifford, also managed the defence of Carlisle against the commons. On 12 January 1537 Cumberland advised the king that the commons were wild and that there was a danger of further rebellion and informed Cromwell that the people were against him.150 The earl tried to capture the rebels’ captains around Westmorland, in accordance with the king’s instructions. His illegitimate son, Thomas Clifford, and Sir Christopher Dacre routed the commons outside Carlisle Castle on 16 February 1537. The earl was elected to the Order of the Garter on 23 April 1537 to reward his loyal service. Henry, Lord Clifford was duly rewarded in June 1538 when he was appointed chief steward of the Yorkshire possessions of the king which had come about as the result of the attainder of Sir Stephen Hamerton.151 Here again is the link between retribution and reward. In April 1542 the earl was granted the Craven estates of Bolton Priory, a house traditionally associated with the Cliffords. However, he died on 22 April 1542.152

  There is an abundance of evidence to support the contention that Henry’s loyal subjects undoubtedly benefited from their behaviour, either during or in the immediate aftermath of the Pilgrimage. The upper echelons of the nobility – the likes of the dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk – have been omitted from this aspect of the study, as the Pilgrimage did not really afford them the advancement and material gain that the other loyal protagonists coveted. However, some peers, such as the Earl of Shrewsbury, profited from the acquisition of ecclesiastical property. Whatever their private convictions, such men capitulated to the new order.

  The most striking example
of meteoric rise and spectacular financial reward during this period is, perhaps, John Dudley, but the material gains and wealth acquired by others, in particular, Arthur Darcy and Richard Morison, are illuminating in terms of demonstrating how conformity resulted in patronage and enhanced social prestige. This is not to say that loyalty during the Pilgrimage was solely responsible. Other factors, such as individual ability and serendipity, must also have been contributory factors in advancement. Richard Rex has emphasised the role that the dissolution of the monasteries played in facilitating grants and rewards. The dissolution, he stated ‘transferred the patronage of hundreds of benefices into lay hands, with the king emerging as far the greatest gainer’.153

  It is hoped that this study has shown that the patronage of the Crown in the North was essential in securing loyalty and compliance. Such patronage was an important tool in the defeat of the Pilgrimage of Grace. Thomas Cromwell’s role in this process, throughout the risings and in the following years until his fall in 1540, was critical and the many examples given here have had to be included to demonstrate just how the Lord Privy Seal operated.

  It is, however, interesting to note that Cromwell was ultimately a mere patron and broker, with an effective network of clients and informants. Many of his former clients continued to prosper despite his demise. The void left by Cromwell was filled by other administrators and patrons acting on behalf of the Crown – he was replaced as secretary jointly by Wriothesley and Sadler.154 Patronage and power were ultimately the preserve of the monarch and continued to be disseminated based upon the evidence of a subject’s service and loyalty. The watershed moment, it can be argued, came here. From this point, religion was inextricably linked with service as a way of demonstrating that loyalty.

  The links between retribution and reward have also been examined and it seems apparent that one man’s misfortune was, inevitably, another man’s gain. Evidence of opportunism, ‘tale-telling’ and avarice has been presented. As Horrox has remarked, subjects were called upon to provide information in a mutually beneficial relationship. It is hard to avoid an impression of vultures circling on the lookout for carcasses. As Kettering has stated, the practice of clientage concealed the cold, hard reality of men and their ambitions coming together.155

  The Pilgrimage of Grace and its aftermath provide an illustration of how patronage and clientage were used in a mutually beneficial way. Henry retained the loyalty of men who were crucial in the movement’s ultimate demise, whilst these clients were rewarded materially and socially, and so fulfilled their personal ambitions.

  It is now time to consider the demise of the Pilgrimage under another spotlight. The rising was defeated on the ground, but how were the ideas and rhetoric it espoused quelled? Or were they? We turn, in the next chapter, to examining perceptions of the Pilgrimage and to analysing the methods the Crown used to attempt to discredit and defeat the ideals which led the Pilgrims to rebel in the first place.

  Notes

  1 Kettering, Patrons, Brokers and Clients, p.6. However, Rosemary Horrox undertook a detailed study of English late medieval patronage in 1991 in her Richard III: A Study in Service. Kevin Sharpe described patronage as the principal currency in the exchange between sovereigns, subordinates and subjects in ‘Representations and Negotiations: Texts, Images and Authority in Early Modern England’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 42, No 3 (September 1999), pp.853–81. More recently, Jacqueline Rose has discussed patronage as a feature of personal rule in ‘Kingship and Counsel in Early Modern England’, p.47.

  2 Kettering, Patrons, Broker and Clients, pp.3–4.

  3 Gunn, Grummitt & Cools, War, State and Society in England and the Netherlands, p.200.

  4 Horrox, Richard III: A Study in Service, pp.1, 3, 5 & 8; Kettering, Patrons, Brokers and Clients, pp.5, 8, 13 & 18.

  5 Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.44.

  6 Kettering, Patrons, Brokers and Clients, p.5.

  7 D.M. Loades, Politics and the Nation, 1450–1660, p.195.

  8 TNA, SP1/111, f.57 (L&P, Vol. XI: 1043); SP1/113, ff.202–3 (L&P, Vol. XI: 1496) (spelling modernised); L&P, Vol. XI: 1178.

  9 L&P, Vol. XIII.II: 571, 254 & 853.

  10 BL, Cotton, Cleo, E/IV, f.260 (L&P, Vol. XIII.II: 854) (spelling modernised).

  11 L&P, Vol. XIII: II: 1179 (spelling modernised); Horrox, Richard III: A Study in Service, p.3.

  12 TNA, SP6/6, ff.84–88; SP 1/110, ff.182–83 (L&P, Vol. XI: 987 & 988).

  13 TNA, SP1/113, ff.181–82 (L&P, Vol. XI: 1481); Zeeveld, Foundations of Tudor Policy, p.179; TNA, SP1/127, f.158 (L&P, Vol. XII.II: 1330); Kettering, Patrons, Brokers and Clients, pp.10 & 25.

  14 L&P, Vol. XV: 613 (3) & 831 (64); L&P, Vol. XVI: 678 (5), (24) & (25); L&P, Vol. XIX.I: 444 (10).

  15 L&P, Vol. XX.II: 266 (6) & (32), 910 (67); L&P, Vol. XXI.II: 640. See also Horrox, Richard III: A Study in Service, p.12.

  16 TNA, SP1/115, ff.95, 104, 105, 111, 113–16; L&P, Vol. XII.I: 261, 263–69.

  17 Joseph Block, ‘Thomas Cromwell’s Patronage of Preaching’, The Sixteenth Century Journal, Vol. 8, No 1 (April 1977), pp.37–50.

  18 TNA, SP1/117, ff. 36–37 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 678); SP1/121, f.57 (L&P, Vol. XII.II: 36); SP1/116, ff.175–78 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 543).

  19 TNA, SP1/116, ff.92–99 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 479).

  20 TNA, SP1/116, ff.210–12 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 590) (spelling modernised); SP1/116, ff.271–75 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 639) (spelling modernised); SP1/117, ff.32–36 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 677); SP1/117, ff.101–03 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 713).

  21 TNA, SP1/116, ff.255–56 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 633); SP1/116, ff.276–77 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 641) (spelling modernised); SP1/118, ff.131–33 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 905); L&P, Vol. XII.I: 973; SP1/118, f.237 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 992) (spelling modernised); SP1/119, f.17 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 1024).

  22 TNA, SP1/119, ff.124, 126 & 128 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 1112, 1113, 1114); SP1/120, f.112 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 1215); SP1/120, f.114 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 1216).

  23 TNA, SP1/120, f.244 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 1317).

  24 TNA, SP1/121, f.164 (L&P, Vol. XII.II: 141); SP1/124, f.92 (L&P, Vol. XII.II: 567) (spelling modernised); SP1/125, f.182 (L&P, Vol. XII.II: 925).

  25 TNA, SP1/122, f.207 (L&P, Vol. XII.II: 209).

  26 TNA, SP1/125, f.213 (L&P, Vol. XII.II: 954); L&P, Vol. XII.II: 1008 (9).

  27 TNA, SP1/122, f.213 (L&P, Vol. XII.II: 226); SP1/124, f.113 (L&P, Vol. XII.II: 588).

  28 Smith, Land and Politics, p.246.

  29 L&P, Vol. XII.II: 100; TNA, SP1/121, f.133 (L&P, Vol. XII.II: 102); SP1/125, f.176 (L&P, Vol. XII.II: 914); L&P, Vol. XII.II: 1060.

  30 L&P, Vol. XIII.I: 591, 597; TNA, SP1/131, f.40 (L&P, Vol. XIII.I: 705); SP1/131, f.139 (L&P, Vol. XIII.I: 825).

  31 L&P, Vol. XIII.I: 1519 (19), (38), (39), (40), (65).

  32 TNA, SP1/140, f.61 (L&P, Vol. XIII.II: 1010); SP1/144, ff.53 & 68 (L&P, Vol. XIV.I: 455, 481); SP1/144, f.145 (L&P, Vol. XIV.I: 566); L&P, Vol. XII.I: 116, 622, 623; L&P, Vol. XII.II: 910 (76).

  33 Dodds, The Pilgrimage of Grace, p.345; Smith, Land and Politics, p.194.

  34 TNA, SP1/114, f.160–62 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 134).

  35 L&P, Vol. XII.I: 197 (spelling modernised).

  36 TNA, SP1/118, f.216 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 967); SP1/119, f.146 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 1129).

  37 C.H. Williams, English Historical Documents, Volume V: 1485–1558, London, 1967, p.108.

  38 TNA, SP1/121, f.128 (L&P, Vol. XII.II: 97).

  39 L&P, Vol. XII.II: 1060, 1008 (27).

  40 L&P, Vol. XIII.I: 1115 (13).

  41 L&P, Vol. XIV.I: 191 (43).

  42 Smith, Land and Politics, p.245.

  43 L&P, Vol. XIV.II: 572 (3); L&P, Vol. XVI: 379 (1), 1488 (5); L&P, Vol. XVII: 714 (18).

  44 L&P, Vol. XVIII.I: 623 (5), (54), (100), 802 (1); L&P, Vol. XIX.I: 80 (23); L&P, Vol. XX.II: 266 (20); L&P, Vol. XXI.I: 1538.

  45 Flower & Norcliffe (ed.), The Visitation of Yorkshire: in the Years 1563 and 1564, p.93.

  46 Bastow, The Catholic Gentry of Yorkshire, 1536–1642, pp.18
, 22, 23 & 25.

  47 TNA, SP1/123, f.195 (L&P, Vol. XII.II: 432).

  48 L&P, Vol. XIII.I: 1115 (1); TNA, SP1/126, f.173 (L&P, Vol. XII.II: 1151).

  49 L&P, Vol. XIV.II: 264 (27); L&P, Vol. XVII: 714 (9); L&P, Vol. XVIII.I: 802 (10); L&P, Vol. XX.I: 690 (32).

  50 Flower & Best, The Visitation of Yorkshire in the Years 1563 and 1564, p.92.

  51 Dodds, The Pilgrimage of Grace, p.345

  52 Bindoff, ‘Sir William Parr’, History of Parliament, p.61.

  53 TNA, SP1/116, ff.210–12 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 590); SP1/116, f.212 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 591).

  54 TNA, SP1/116, f.231 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 608); SP1/116, ff.271–75 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 639).

  55 TNA, SP1/117, ff.32–36 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 677).

  56 L&P, Vol. XII.I: 795 (14).

  57 TNA, SP1/120, f.106 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 1213).

  58 TNA, SP1/120, f.138 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 1227).

  59 TNA, SP1/120, f.218 (L&P, Vol. XII.I: 1298).

  60 TNA, SP1/124, f.9 (L&P, Vol. XII.II: 489).

  61 TNA, SP7/1, f.18 (L&P, Vol. XII.II: 657).

  62 TNA, SP1/126, f.139 (L&P, Vol. XII.II: 1102).

  63 TNA, SP1/128, f.55 (L&P, Vol. XIII.I: 65).

  64 L&P, Vol. XIII.I: 887 (17), 1519 (13), 1520 (34).

  65 Bindoff, History of Parliament, p.61.

  66 L&P, Vol. XIV: II: 239.

  67 TNA, SP1/144, f.51; (L&P, Vol. XIV.I: 453).

  68 L&P, Vol. XVIII.II: 516.

  69 L&P, Vol. XIX.I: 141 (75).

  70 Bindoff, History of Parliament, p.61.

  71 L&P, Vol. XXI.II: 476 (10).

  72 TNA PRO, PROB 11/32, sig. 6. See Gunn, Grummitt & Cools, War, State and Society in England and the Netherlands, p.177, for discussion of power and patronage.